Glossary

This glossary is intentionally short. It defines the terms that carry the most weight across the site.

Agency

We will use agency to mean: the capacity of a system to regulate the future using models, rather than only reacting to the present. Talk32:16

Attention

We will use attention to mean: the selective allocation of limited processing resources so that some contents become more available for control, learning, and coordination. Paperpp. 16–18

Coherence

We will use coherence to mean: a reduction of contradiction or constraint violation among simultaneously active mental contents, so the system can act more like one agent. Paperpp. 16–18

Computationalism

We will use computationalism to mean: the view that the relevant organization of mind can, in principle, be implemented as computation rather than being tied only to one biological material. Paperpp. 6–8

Computationalist functionalism

We will use computationalist functionalism to mean: the joint stance that conscious mind depends on functional organization, and that such organization may be implementable on computational machines. This does not imply that current computers are conscious. Paperpp. 6–8

Consciousness

We will use consciousness to mean: a special mode of mental organization in which content is present to the system as present, often via second-order perception, and in which mental states are made more coherent for agency. Paperpp. 15–18 +1p. 20

Feeling

We will use feeling to mean: a consciously accessible evaluation of reality and the self that carries valence and shapes attention, learning, and action. Paperp. 13

Free will

We will use free will to mean: the capacity of an agent to act according to higher-order commitments rather than being overruled by compulsive local loops. Talk36:40

Genesis Hypothesis

We will use Genesis Hypothesis to mean: the idea that consciousness appears early in development and may play an instrumental role in building coherent reality-models, selfhood, and intelligent agency. Paperpp. 18–20

Imagination

We will use imagination to mean: hypothetical or internally generated world-content produced by the same broad modeling machinery as perception, but with weaker present sensory constraint. Paperpp. 13–15

Intellect

We will use intellect to mean: the more explicit, reflective, concept-using aspect of the mind associated with symbolic thought, planning, and analysis. It is part of mind, not the whole of it. Paperpp. 12–13

Mind

We will use mind to mean: the larger modeling-and-control matrix in which perceptions, feelings, thoughts, intuitions, imaginations, self-models, and action policies are organized for agency. Paperpp. 12–15 Talk32:16

Perception

We will use perception to mean: the structuring of sensory input into usable representation. In this framework, perception is already constructive rather than a raw copy of physics. Paperp. 15

Phenomenal reality

We will use phenomenal reality to mean: sensory representation that is currently being confirmed. Paperp. 15

Presence / presentness

We will use presence or presentness to mean: the felt fact that experience is happening now; one of the central phenomenological markers of consciousness. Paperp. 15 +1p. 20

Psyche

We will use psyche to mean: the combination of a personal self and the motivational “strings” that pull on it, within a mind that models self, interests, and world. Paperp. 13

Qualia

We will use qualia to mean: the qualitative character of experience, what a state is like from the inside. Interview01:58:03

Realness

We will use realness to mean: the representation of something currently being the case. Paperp. 15

Self

We will use self to mean: the model of the agent as me — with a point of view, boundaries, concerns, commitments, and a story across time. Talk16:47 Interview25:57

Self-model

We will use self-model to mean: the explicit or implicit representation a mind builds of itself as an agent inside its own world-model. Talk16:47

Second-order perception

We will use second-order perception to mean: awareness not only of content, but of the fact that representation is taking place now. Paperpp. 14–15 +1p. 20

Third-order perception

We will use third-order perception to mean: awareness of the self as the observer within the act of observation — a more explicit first-person standpoint. Paperpp. 15–16

Valence

We will use valence to mean: the positive or negative significance of states for the system; the broad way a mind marks what counts as better, worse, urgent, dangerous, or rewarding. Paperp. 13 Talk27:50

Virtualism

We will use virtualism to mean: the view that the experienced world and self are real as implemented model-objects or causal structure, not as separate substances outside physics. Talk17:39 Talk19:53